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While we cannot legislate for what anyone believes, we can question what they believe. In 
most cases, what someone believes may be of little consequence; however, when those 
beliefs have the potential to influence practice and misinform patients, then we may have to 
take closer look. 
Clearly, one person’s doubt can be another person’s truth. For example, the concept of a 
personal God is beyond the pale for many people but, generally, those who believe and those 
who do not believe tend to rub along quite well provided the beliefs are not extreme, 
expressed in offensive terms or results in people being burned at the stake. However, the 
veracity of the claims regarding faith are not amenable to investigation; other things are. For 
example, some people believe that the world is flat while, demonstrably, it is not. This is a 
harmless belief which says more about the believer than anything related to reality. Others 
believe in the power of positive thinking who, while only marginally more annoying than 
other people to be around, probably do no harm but who, of course, also have nothing to 
substantiate their views. 
But what about beliefs that could lead to harming the believer and other people? Here we are 
referring to beliefs in un-tested and unproven remedies which we will refer to collectively as 
CAM (complementary and alternative medicine). That the range of these so-called therapies 
is extensive, and they survive and thrive on our highstreets is testament to people’s desire for 
alternatives to mainstream healthcare. It is also testament to their gullibility. However, we 
can excuse some of the general public their ignorance as they may not have the necessary 
knowledge to assess whether something is, on the one hand, likely to work and, on the other 
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hand, to assess whether it is really working. And who can blame them? We are bombarded 
daily with conflicting health related information. One day aspirin is the miracle drug; next 
day it is not; and the next day it is dangerous. Likewise, depending on which day you read the 
newspaper, alcohol helps us to live longer/ kills us more quickly/ helps to prevent cognitive 
decline/ accelerates cognitive decline. These truth in these stories is obscured in the reporting 
and very frequently, primary sources are not referred to. Taking alcohol as an example, those 
of us who drink tend to take the messages that are positive and ignore the negative ones to 
support our continued drinking. The same happens to someone who is wary of conventional 
medicine and sees a positive message about a CAM; they point to this in support of their 
view and confuse this with support for the efficacy of a particular CAM. Argument and facts 
are ineffective against prejudice and we tend to waste our time pointing out to them the error 
of their choices, far less the error in their thinking. Extend an argument long enough with any 
CAM adherent and you will inevitably arrive at the pragmatic fallacy: ‘well, it works for 
me!’.  The pragmatic fallacy is compounded by reverse causation: ‘I got better, therefore it 
worked’ which is often enough to convince people that something genuinely works. 
Of course, the correct source of evidence is causation: ‘something works, therefore you got 
better’ and this is especially true of therapies that cannot possibly work. A prime example is 
homeopathy where there is no active ingredient—nor, indeed a claim by adherents that one is 
present—and the purported existence of a ‘memory’ of the active substance by some 
arrangement of the water molecules is impossible. In any case, the ‘active’ ingredients which 
are subsequently diluted beyond existence are not related to any cures for the conditions 
being treated, rather, they mimic the symptoms thereby conferring curative properties. In the 
case of homeopathy there can be no causation, only reverse causation which, as we know, is 
not any kind of causation. Both the pragmatic fallacy and reverse causation ignore a 
fundamental truth which is that most minor illnesses get better spontaneously as the body 
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defends itself or the person wrongly attributes their improvement to a complementary therapy 
while simultaneously taking a range of conventional remedies. 
Taking any remedy—alternative or conventional—induces the placebo effect whereby there 
is often a degree of improvement purely as a result of taking something and being attended to 
by one of many practitioners: doctors, pharmacists or alternative healers. The placebo effect 
is powerful, it is reported to work on animals and even sham surgery for some conditions is 
reported to work. The placebo effect can be tested, and this is best done using a control group 
against which to test the purported therapy. A control group will receive the same attention as 
the treatment group but without the treatment, often by way of placebo medications with no 
active ingredient. However, here we move from the pragmatic fallacy to the ‘paradigmatic 
fallacy’ whereby the alternative therapists claim that their remedies cannot be tested by the 
same methods as conventional therapies. They often claim that there is a great deal more to 
their therapies than simply administering a pill; therapies are ‘tailored’ to the specific needs 
of the patient. But they are wrong; people either get better or they don’t; and that can be 
measured. No matter how much consultation and tailoring for treatments takes place there is 
always a point at which a person can be administered the purported treatment, or a placebo 
and the outcome measured and compared between sufficiently size groups of people in either 
treatment or control groups. 
 
If it’s published it must be true 
Supporters of CAM often point to studies that purport to show that it works and here they 
often make a series of errors. First, they assume that simply because something is published 
that it automatically demonstrates that it works. Close inspection of the purported evidence 
often reveals another story. Some studies of CAM do appear to provide evidence for efficacy, 
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even in terms of the primary outcome – some improvement in the underlying condition. But 
there is always a chance that any study will throw up a positive outcome. Some studies of 
established treatments throw up negative outcomes. This is called regression to the mean. 
Except the efficacy of parachutes for jumping out of planes, most things actually don’t work 
as well as we think, and it is only after repeated studies that the true measure of an effect can 
be seen. Therefore, we should not jump to conclusions based on a single study. Another trick 
of the CAM trade is to claim that a treatment works based on secondary outcomes. For 
example, a CAM may be tested for its efficacy as an analgesic (primary outcome) and 
satisfaction with the treatment experience (secondary outcome) may also be measured. In this 
situation there are four possible outcomes: i) pain and satisfaction are higher in the treatment 
group; ii) pain and satisfaction are worse or no higher in the treatment group; iii) pain 
improves but satisfaction does not; and iv) satisfaction improves but pain does not. Only 
outcomes i) and iii) can lead to a legitimate claim that the treatment works for pain. However, 
CAM studies are often reported as positive based on outcome iv) alone where there is no 
analgesic effect, but the patients are more satisfied. It often requires careful reading of the 
study report to ascertain the truth. The truth is that synthesis of the evidence regarding CAM 
consistently shows that claims for efficacy are false; yet these claims persist. 
Nurses 
Nurses are now properly educated in research methods, evidence assessment, and evidence-
based practice. Belief in egg white and oxygen has been replaced by evidence-based 
preventative measures for pressure injury prevention and treatment; salt baths suffered the 
same fate. So, why do some nurses continue to believe in CAM. Think of your colleagues. 
How many reveal that they have regular massages, see chiropractors, osteopaths, 
homeopaths, use Bach’s flower therapy, or are taking a course in aromatherapy or any of a 
wide range of unproven remedies? Some will try to explain their adherence in terms of what 
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these practitioners claim. Apparently, masseuses find ‘knots’ in the muscle and work on them 
and that you know this by the pain at that point; chiropractors can realign their postural 
muscles. The first claim is a classic example of reverse causation: the masseuse pokes about 
until he/she finds a painful point which may have been caused by anything, or a ‘tense point’ 
and works on it…and you believe it. There are no such things as ‘knots’ in muscles. 
Likewise, muscles cannot be aligned or realigned – there is simply no anatomical or 
physiological evidence to support these phenomena. Homeopathy and Bach’s flower therapy 
contain nothing, and aromatherapy makes a nice smell but does not have any other 
demonstrated clinical effects. 
Is it wrong that nurses should hold these beliefs? Yes, holding these beliefs per se is wrong 
for an educated person but probably not harmful to patients. But if these beliefs are promoted 
by nurses, then that is both wrong and potentially harmful to patients. Nurses are in a position 
of trust and if they actively promote CAM or quietly recommend CAM to patients, even of 
only obliquely as in ‘I find this works’ or ‘I regularly visit…’ then is there a case to be 
answered. Should nursing regulatory bodies take an interest? The UK nursing regulator, the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), code is quite clear when stipulating that nurses 
should ‘always practise in line with the best available evidence’. Section 6.1 of the NMC 
Code is very clear when it states that nurses should: 
6.1 make sure that any information or advice given is evidence-based, including 
information relating to using any health and care products or services (NMC 2018) 
Taking this at its highest – advising or appearing to advise a patient to use a therapy where 
there is no evidence for its effectiveness could legitimately lead to a question of competence 
against that practitioner. 
